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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

ENTROPIC COMMUNICATIONS,
LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

DISH NETWORK CORPORATION,
et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:23-cv-1043-JWH-KES
(Lead Case)

Case No. 2:23-cv-1047-JWH-KES
(Related Case)

Case No. 2:23-cv-1048-JWH-KES
(Related Case)

Case No. 2:23-cv-5253-JWH-KES
(Related Case)

[Assigned to the Honorable John W.
Holcomb]

**ENTROPIC COMMUNICATIONS,
LLC’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS COX
DEFENDANTS’ AMENDED
COUNTERCLAIMS PURSUANT TO
RULE 12(b)(6)**

REFERRED TO SPECIAL MASTER

Previously-set hearing, now vacated

Hearing Date: March 29, 2024

Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.

Courtroom: 9D

ENTROPIC COMMUNICATIONS,
LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC., *et*
al.,

Defendants.

**REDACTED VERSION OF DOCUMENT PROPOSED TO BE
FILED UNDER SEAL**

**ENTROPIC’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS COX
DEFENDANTS’ AMENDED COUNTERCLAIMS**

1 ENTROPIC COMMUNICATIONS,
2 LLC,

3 Plaintiff,

4 v.

5 COMCAST, *et al.*,

6 Defendants.
7
8

9 ENTROPIC COMMUNICATIONS,
10 LLC,

11 Plaintiff,

12 v.

13 DIRECTV, LLC, *et al.*,

14 Defendants.
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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Cox's Counterclaims rely on facially erroneous readings of the MoCA IPR
3 Policy and of the MoCA confidentiality protections. Because Cox's Counterclaims
4 are contrary to the plain terms of the IPR Policy and confidentiality requirements,
5 they fail as a matter of law and must be dismissed.

6 Fatally, Cox wrongly asserts that the IPR Policy obligated MaxLinear to
7 retain, for all time, the right to grant licenses to any essential patent claims. In truth,
8 the IPR Policy expressly *permits* parties to assign their patent rights to successors-
9 in-interest. To ensure that RAND licenses will continue to be offered after
10 assignment, the obligation to license on RAND terms travels with the patent and
11 binds the new owner: "the licensing obligations under this IPR Policy are intended
12 to be binding (e.g., as encumbrances) on all successors-in-interest." IPR Policy
13 § 5.1.2. And it confirms this is so regardless of the specific language used to assign
14 essential patents. *Id.* The IPR Policy does not require the original patent owner to
15 retain the right to license because the assurance that RAND licenses will continue
16 to be available is that the licensing obligations bind the *successors-in-interest*.
17 There is no provision requiring the Alliance Party who originally owned the patents
18 retain a right to license. Further still, Section 5.1.2 states that "[a]n Alliance Party
19 may choose the manner in which it complies with this Section 5.1.2." MaxLinear
20 chose to comply by assigning all rights, interests, and obligations to Entropic. The
21 obligation to offer licenses under the terms of the IPR Policy was among the
22 assigned obligations. Cox's position that the IPR Policy required MaxLinear to
23 retain a right to license the patents is unsupportable given the plain language of the
24 IPR Policy permitting assignments, and thus cannot plausibly support a claim for
25 breach of contract (Count II). Furthermore, without a breach of contract, the
26 tortious interference claim also automatically fails (Count III).

1 Likewise, Cox does not plausibly allege that the MoCA standards documents
2 in question were subject to confidentiality obligations, nor that Entropic committed
3 intentional acts designed to induce MaxLinear to violate any such obligations. The
4 documents state on their face that they issued in 2013. The applicable
5 confidentiality protections expired [REDACTED]. Therefore, no confidentiality
6 obligations were in effect when Entropic received the documents from MaxLinear
7 in 2021. As a matter of law there can be no violation of a non-existent obligation.
8 And even if Cox's pleadings were somehow sufficient (which they are not), the
9 Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over them because the confidentiality
10 claims do not depend on any question of federal patent law.

11 Therefore, Cox is unable to make a plausible showing that it is entitled to
12 relief, and the Court should dismiss the Counterclaims against Entropic.

13 **II. ARGUMENT**

14 Cox seeks a declaration that the transfer of patents to Entropic was void
15 (Count II) and asserts a claim of tortious interference with contract (Count III).
16 These counterclaims hinge on two erroneous theories: (1) that MaxLinear breached
17 the IPR Policy by transferring the Asserted Patents to Entropic without retaining for
18 itself the right to grant licenses; and (2) that MaxLinear breached confidentiality
19 obligations by disclosing MoCA standards documents to Entropic. Because neither
20 theory is properly pled, Counts II and III of Cox's Counterclaims fail as a matter of
21 law.

22 **A. Cox has not plausibly alleged a breach of the IPR Policy because** 23 **MaxLinear was not bound to retain a licensing right.**

24 Cox cannot plausibly allege a breach of the IPR Policy because the
25 unambiguous terms of the Policy show that MaxLinear was not required to retain
26 the right to grant licenses to essential patents. Cox concedes that the IPR Policy
27 expressly permits assignment of essential patent claims. *See* Opp. Br. at 19; *see also*
28

1 IPR Policy § 5.1.2. Cox does not dispute that the IPR Policy’s licensing obligations
2 “run with the patent[s]” under *Datatreasury*. See *Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells*
3 *Fargo & Co.*, 552 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Opp. Br. at 19–22.
4 Instead, Cox takes the absurd position that MaxLinear was allowed to assign the
5 Asserted Patents, but still had to “retain the right to grant any licenses for essential
6 patents.” Opp. Br. at 19. This theory fails on several counts.

7 First, Cox’s interpretation directly contradicts the plain terms of the IPR
8 Policy, specifically the provision that expressly governs “Transfer of Essential
9 Patent Claims.” See IPR Policy § 5.1.2. That Policy explicitly states, in full:

10 **5.1.2 Transfer of Essential Patent Claims.** Any sale, *assignment* or
11 other transfer by an Alliance Party or its Affiliates to an unaffiliated
12 third party of an Essential Patent Claim, or any patent or patent
13 application that reasonably may contain or result in an Essential Patent
14 Claim, shall be made subject to the terms in this IPR Policy. *An Alliance*
15 *Party may choose the manner in which it complies with this Section*
16 *5.1.2*, provided that any agreement for transferring or assigning
17 Essential Patent Claims, or any patent or patent application that
18 reasonably may contain or result in an Essential Patent Claim, *includes*
19 *a provision that such transfer or assignment is subject to existing*
20 *licenses and obligations to license* imposed on the Alliance Party by
21 this Agreement and the Alliance Bylaws, and that the transferee will
22 similarly include appropriate provisions in the event of future transfers
23 with the goal of *binding each successor-in-interest*. Moreover, the
24 *licensing obligations under this IPR Policy are intended to be binding*
25 (e.g., as encumbrances) *on all successors-in-interest* regardless of
26 whether such provisions are included.

1 *Id.* (emphases added). Section 5.1.2 thus contemplates that (1) an Alliance Party
2 can choose how to comply with Section 5.1.2; and (2) the licensing obligations in
3 Section 5.1.2 are binding on “successors-in-interest” upon transfer, not the Alliance
4 Party itself. The explicit reference to “successors-in-interest” confirms that the IPR
5 Policy contemplates successors stepping into the shoes of an Alliance Party and
6 assuming the obligations therein. *See, e.g., Mehul’s Inv. Corp. v. ABC Advisors,*
7 *Inc.*, 130 F. Supp. 2d 700, 706 (D. Md. 2001). Further, Section 5.1.2 is specifically
8 directed to transfers of patent rights and obligations. This is the section that governs
9 transfers, not the other sections cited by Cox which relate to warranties and the like.
10 *See MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co.*, 29 Cal. App. 3d 413, 421 (Cal.
11 Ct. App. 1972) (“where a general and a particular provision of a written instrument
12 are inconsistent, the particular controls the general”). The plain language of Section
13 5.1.2 squarely rejects Cox’s interpretation that an Alliance Party is forever bound to
14 the licensing obligations and cannot assign them. Cox’s counterclaims fail for this
15 reason alone.

16 Second, Cox’s interpretation contradicts basic principles of patent law.
17 Section 5.1.2 expressly contemplates an “assignment” of IP property rights.
18 “Assignment” in the patent context refers to the transfer of “all substantial rights” in
19 the patent. *See Alfred E. Mann Foun. For Sci. v. Cochlear Corp.*, 604 F. 3d 1354,
20 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Part of those substantial rights include the right to exclude or
21 license others. *See, e.g., Sicom Systems, Ltd. v. Agilent Technologies, Inc.*, 427 F.3d
22 971, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The parties to the IPR Policy are presumed to understand
23 the legal import of terms like “assignment” as used in their agreement. *See*
24 *generally Hilton v. McNitt*, 49 Cal. 2d 79, 82 (Cal. 1957) (parties and their
25 attorneys presumed to know the law applicable to such agreements). Thus, the IPR
26 Policy contemplates an “assignment” of patents that would permit Alliance
27 Members to assign “all substantial rights,” including the right to grant licenses.
28

1 If the IPR Policy were intended to force Alliance Parties to retain the right to
2 grant licenses and bar them from ever transferring that right, then the IPR Policy
3 would have far different language. For one, it would never have referred to
4 “assignments.” Further, it would have had language explaining the scope of that
5 perpetual licensing right, such as whether that right is non-exclusive, or whether the
6 Alliance Party needs to obtain consent from the new patent owner before exercising
7 that right, or whether the Alliance Party is required to give the new patent owner
8 notice and an opportunity to object. No such provisions are present, and for good
9 reason: the IPR Policy does not, and was never intended to, force Alliance Parties
10 to retain a licensing right for all time. Instead, Section 5.1.2 permits an *assignment*
11 that conveys all rights and obligations in the patents covered by the IPR Policy.
12 Because the licensing obligations travel with the patents to the successor, the IPR
13 Policy has no need to force the original owner to license the patents as well.

14 Third, Cox’s reading of Section 4 is untenable and improperly creates
15 conflict with other provisions of the IPR Policy. Cox turns to Section 4.1.2 to
16 fabricate a “perpetual licensing right.” But that section says nothing about a
17 licensing right existing in perpetuity. Rather, it is a standard warranty provision by
18 which signatories warranted that they had the power and authority to carry out the
19 IPR Policy:

20 Each Alliance Party represents, warrants and covenants to the Alliance
21 and to other Alliance Parties that it has the power and authority to bind
22 itself and all of its Affiliates to the obligations contained herein,
23 including without limitation, the obligation to grant patent licenses as
24 set forth in this IPR Policy.

25 IPR Policy § 4.1.2. This section simply confirms that signatories had the power to
26 bind both themselves and their Affiliates under the IPR Policy when they signed it.
27 Nowhere does it create an obligation to *retain* licensing rights to patents for all
28

1 time. To the contrary, Section 5.1.2 is clear that rights in essential patents—
2 including licensing obligations—can be assigned or transferred to third parties.

3 Section 4.1.1 further confirms that the provisions of Section 4 cannot be read
4 to conflict with Section 5.1.2, as Cox seeks to do. Section 4.1.1 states that “[a]ll
5 right, title and interest in and to Alliance Party Intellectual Property shall be owned
6 exclusively by the Alliance Party(ies) who developed the Intellectual Property...”
7 IPR Policy § 4.1.1. Under Cox’s reading of Section 4—*i.e.*, that this section recites
8 an obligation which extends in perpetuity—there could never be a transfer of
9 intellectual property to a third party because IP could only be owned by an Alliance
10 Party. This is very clearly wrong, as Section 5.1.2 confirms that transfers to “third
11 parties” are permissible and expressly contemplated. Cox’s reading of Section 4
12 creates conflict with Section 5.1.2, and thus is legally erroneous and must be
13 rejected.

14 The unreasonableness of Cox’s position is underscored by its self-
15 contradictory arguments. In its pleading, Cox alleged that Section 4.1.1 “required
16 that any such essential patents shall be owned by an ‘Alliance Party’” for all time.
17 DE 276 (“Countercl.”) ¶ 547; *see also* ¶ 581 (alleging that MaxLinear “promise[d]
18 that it would exclusively own the relevant intellectual property necessary to the
19 MoCA standards”). Perhaps realizing that these assertions are flatly contrary to the
20 assignment provision of Section 5.1.2, Cox changed its tune in its opposition brief.
21 There, Cox tries to pivot to an interpretation of the IPR Policy that no longer
22 required MaxLinear to own the patents in perpetuity, but still required it to make a
23 choice: “continue to own the relevant patents” *or else* retain the right to grant
24 licenses. Opp. at 19. This “choice” is nowhere in the IPR Policy and is inconsistent
25 with Cox’s own position that Section 4 recites “present and future” promises that
26 apply for all time. *Id.* at 20. Cox has drifted so far from the plain text of the IPR
27 Policy that Cox itself cannot keep its contorted views consistent.

1 Here, the terms of the IPR Policy are unambiguous and should be given their
2 plain meaning. *See Salesbrain, Inc. v. AngelVision Technologies*, No. 12-cv-5026,
3 2013 WL 1191236, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2013) (“Where the terms of the
4 contract are unambiguous, a court must enforce the contract according to its plain
5 meaning”). Under those plain terms, MaxLinear had the right and the choice to
6 assign its licensing obligations to a third party (Entropic), and those obligations
7 would flow with the assignment. Cox’s Counterclaims rely on a legally erroneous
8 reading of the IPR Policy and should be dismissed with prejudice.

9 **B. Cox has not plausibly alleged a breach or harm from any breach**
10 **related to RAND licensing obligations.**

11 Cox’s Counterclaims should also be dismissed because they fail to allege a
12 breach, or any harm from an alleged breach, of the licensing obligations in the IPR
13 Policy. In its Counterclaims, Cox alleges that Entropic induced MaxLinear to
14 breach the requirement to offer a RAND license. Countercl. ¶ 584. According to
15 Cox, *current* members must submit a “written request” under Section 5.1, whereas
16 *former* members may request a license in any form they want, including verbally.
17 *See* Opp. Br. at 10. Cox again misreads the IPR Policy. The Policy specifies that
18 former members may request a license “under Section 5.1,” IPR Policy § 7.1, and
19 Section 5.1 specifies that requests must be in writing. *See id.* § 5.1.1. Section 7.1 in
20 no way grants more rights to *former* members than to *current* members. To the
21 contrary, the rights of former members under Section 7.1 are cabined by Section
22 5.1, and then those rights are further limited by precluding former members from
23 requesting licenses on standards adopted after the member left the MoCA Alliance.
24 *Id.* § 7.1. Cox’s misreading of Sections 5.1 and 7.1 further demonstrate that its
25 allegations of breach are contrary to the plain terms of the IPR Policy and should be
26 dismissed.

1 Second, Cox argues that it does not matter whether the parties successfully
2 breached the policy. What matters, according to Cox, is that Entropic and
3 MaxLinear “affirmatively sought” to unencumber the patents. *See* Opp. Br. at 21.
4 But an **attempted** breach of contract is not a breach of contract. *See generally First*
5 *Nat. Bank v. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank*, 933 F.2d 466, 469 (7th Cir. 1991)
6 (finding no injury where defendant attempted unsuccessfully to breach the
7 contract); *see also Haskell v. Santander Bank, N.A.*, No. 17-cv-11288, 2018 WL
8 1750459, at *1 (D. Mass. Apr. 10, 2018) (“there has been no breach of any alleged
9 promise not to foreclose on the property, and there is no cause of action for an
10 attempted breach of an agreement”); *Demalco Ltd. v. Feltner*, 588 F. Supp. 1277,
11 1280 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“plaintiff alleges not a breach of contract but an attempted
12 breach”). Without a breach, there can be no claim for tortious interference. *See*
13 *Name.Space, Inc. v. Internet Corp. for Assigned Names & Numbers*, 795 F.3d 1124,
14 1133 (9th Cir. 2015). And, in any event, the IPR Policy is explicit that licensing
15 obligations are binding on successors-in-interest “regardless of whether [specific
16 provisions about the encumbrances] are included.” IPR Policy § 5.1.2. Therefore,
17 Cox has failed to plead breach of contract.

18 Lastly, Cox’s counterclaim pleads that “Cox is entitled to receive” a RAND
19 offer “from MaxLinear, and only MaxLinear.” (Countercl. ¶ 579.) But it pleads no
20 harm from receiving a RAND offer from Entropic instead. Cox argues in its brief
21 that “the identi[t]y of MaxLinear as counterparty would result in far different
22 outcomes on RAND rates.” Opp Br. 26–27. Cox never pleads such a harm, let alone
23 explains what harm comes from those purportedly “different outcomes.” Further,
24 Cox’s assertion is legally wrong: a RAND offer must be non-discriminatory, and
25 thus “the commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee is irrelevant.”
26 *Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc.*, 773 F.3d 1201, 1230–31 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Cox’s
27
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1 speculation that it could get a more favorable RAND offer from MaxLinear as
2 opposed to Entropic is contrary to law and cannot state a cognizable harm.

3 **C. Cox has not plausibly alleged that it is entitled to relief based on**
4 **the alleged disclosure of confidential MoCA documents.**

5 Cox has not plead a viable tortious interference claim based on the alleged
6 breach of disclosure of confidential documents. What Cox pleads suffers from two
7 critical deficiencies. *First*, Cox does not plausibly allege there was an actual breach
8 of any confidentiality obligations because the pleadings facially show that any such
9 confidentiality obligations had already expired. Without a breach there is no
10 tortious interference. *Second*, Cox's pleadings are devoid of any specific allegations
11 as to how Entropic induced MaxLinear to breach its confidentiality obligations.
12 Either one of these deficiencies is fatal to Cox's tortious interference claim based
13 on the alleged disclosure of confidential documents.

14 **1. Cox has not plausibly alleged that MaxLinear violated**
15 **confidentiality obligations.**

16 Cox alleges that MaxLinear violated confidentiality obligations, specifically
17 the confidentiality obligations set forth in Section 5 of Cox's MoCA membership
18 agreement.¹ See DE 276 ("Countercl.") ¶¶ 535, 546. [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED]
20 [REDACTED] See DE 336 ("Motion") at 15. The
21 "confidential" MoCA standards documents that were allegedly shared with
22 Entropic all purport to have issued no later than November 2013, meaning that any
23 Cox confidential information published therein would have necessarily been
24 "disclosed" by Cox before that date. By the time Entropic came onto the scene in
25

26¹ Specifically, Cox alleges that MaxLinear signed a similar membership agreement,
27 which bound MaxLinear to the same confidentiality terms as set forth in Cox's
28 membership agreement. See Countercl. ¶ 535; see also ¶ 546 (alleging
that MaxLinear "agreed to the same or equivalent confidentiality terms" as
described in Section 5 of Cox's membership agreement.).

1 2021, any duty to keep that information confidential was well past its expiration
2 date. *See* 2:23-cv-1047, DE 1 ¶ 33 (Entropic formed in 2021).

3 Cox dismisses this fundamental failure to state a claim as mere “timing
4 details.” *See* Opp. Br. at 22. Not so. The term of a contract obligation, and
5 expiration thereof, is a core issue, not a detail. Courts dismiss claims of breach
6 where the confidentiality requirements have expired on their own terms. *See*
7 *Salesbrain, Inc. v. AngelVision Tech.*, No. 12-cv-05026, 2013 WL 1191236, at
8 *12–14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2013) (dismissing claim for breach of NDA based on
9 Court’s finding that the NDA obligations expired before the allegedly breaching
10 conduct); *see also QuickLogic Corp. v. Konda Techs., Inc.*, 618 F. Supp. 3d 873,
11 886 n. 7 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (NDA could not form the basis of any breach of contract
12 or confidentiality claim that occurred after the contract expired). Here, Cox does
13 not and cannot allege that the confidentiality provisions at issue were still in effect
14 when the alleged conduct took place. That is fatal because a party cannot breach a
15 contract provision that has expired, and uncontroverted facts—within the pleading
16 itself—show that is the case. Because Cox fails to show that it is plausibly entitled
17 to relief based on the disclosure of the MoCA standards, its claim necessarily fails.

18 **2. Cox has not plausibly alleged any specific acts by Entropic**
19 **designed to induce MaxLinear to breach its confidentiality**
20 **obligations.**

21 Beyond the expiration of the relevant contract provision, Cox’s claim also
22 fails because there are no allegations of any specific acts by Entropic to induce
23 MaxLinear’s alleged conduct. Cox argues that its Counterclaims sufficiently “aver”
24 Entropic was aware of the confidentiality of the MoCA documents and
25 affirmatively sought their disclosure from MaxLinear. *See* Opp. Br. at 16 (citing DE
26 266-1 ¶¶ 561, 568–69). However, the paragraphs Cox cites do not contain any such
27 allegations.

1 Paragraph 561 vaguely alleges that “in the course of negotiating the lengthy
2 and complex Patent Purchase Agreement, Plaintiff learned of and was informed of
3 the MoCA standards.” Countercl. ¶ 561. Paragraph 568 alleges that [REDACTED]
4 [REDACTED]
5 [REDACTED]
6 [REDACTED] Finally, Paragraph 569 alleges that “[REDACTED]
7 [REDACTED], Plaintiff obtained
8 copies of the otherwise confidential MoCA standards and has relied on those
9 clearly marked confidential material to which it should not have had access to
10 prepare and send its correspondence in 2022 to Cox and to prepare and bring this
11 suit.” *Id.* ¶ 569. Nowhere are there allegations that “Entropic was aware of the
12 confidentiality of the MoCA documents” or that Entropic “affirmatively sought
13 their disclosure from MaxLinear” despite first having such knowledge. Absent such
14 allegations, Cox cannot plead a claim for inducement related to the alleged breach
15 of confidentiality.

16 The only other fact Cox argues in support of its Counterclaim is that the
17 documents in question are stamped “MoCA Confidential.” *See* Opp. Br. at 16. But
18 all this shows is that, at most, Entropic would have become aware of the
19 confidential marking of the documents ***only upon receiving the documents***. It does
20 not lend any credence to Entropic being aware of the confidential nature of the
21 documents prior to their disclosure, let alone that Entropic induced MaxLinear to
22 violate confidentiality obligations.

23 Cox cites case law that broadly stands for the point that interference does not
24 have to be the defendant’s primary motive. *See Moore v. Apple, Inc.*, 73 F. Supp. 3d
25 1191, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2014). While that is true, it misses the point. Cox must still
26 plausibly allege that Entropic “knew that the interference was certain or
27 substantially certain to occur as a result of its action.” *Kor. Supply Co. v. Lockheed*
28

1 *Martin Corp.*, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 29, 45 (2003). The three paragraphs of the
2 Counterclaims cited above do not come close to meeting this standard. All they
3 show is that Entropic received the documents in question and that the documents
4 were stamped “confidential.” Therefore, Cox has not sufficiently pleaded tortious
5 interference based on the alleged breach of confidentiality obligations.

6 **D. The confidentiality claims do not “depend[] on the resolution of a**
7 **substantial question of federal patent law.”**

8 Finally, to the extent the Court finds that Cox has sufficiently pleaded
9 tortious interference based only on the alleged disclosure of confidential
10 information, the claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
11 pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). This claim is not a federal question, and the Court lacks
12 supplemental jurisdiction because the claim does not “depend[] on the resolution of
13 a substantial question of federal patent law.” *Fortinet, Inc. v. Forescout Techs.,*
14 *Inc.*, No. 20-cv-03343-EMC, 2021 WL 5565836, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2021)
15 (citing *Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc.*, 986 F.2d 476,
16 477–78 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).

17 Whether MaxLinear improperly disclosed confidential MoCA documents
18 does not depend on patent law at all, much less on “resolution of a substantial
19 question of federal patent law.” *See Fortinet*, 2021 WL 5565836 at *18. The only
20 connection Cox points to between the confidentiality claims and the underlying
21 patent infringement suit is a (false) assertion that Entropic would not have been able
22 to bring this suit but for its access to the MoCA documents. *See Countercl.* ¶ 569.
23 But what claims might arise from some document is not connected with the
24 propriety of obtaining the document.

25 Realizing the danger, Cox also argues that the confidentiality claim arises
26 from the same case or controversy as the other tortious interference claims. *See*
27 *Opp. Br.* at 29. Cox misapplies the law. The confidentiality claim must be
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1 connected to the federal claim directly, not indirectly. It is not sufficient to be
2 connected only to one of the other state claims. There is no “chain rule” of
3 supplemental jurisdiction. Cox’s other tortious interference claims at least relate to
4 the assignment of patents and thus plausibly implicate issues unique to patent law.
5 But the same cannot be said for the confidentiality claims, which must be dismissed
6 for this jurisdictional reason as well.

7 **III. CONCLUSION**

8 For the foregoing reasons, Entropic respectfully requests that this Court
9 dismiss Cox’s Amended Counterclaims that Entropic tortiously interfered with the
10 MoCA IPR Policy (Count III) and that the patent assignments from MaxLinear to
11 Entropic are void (Count II), with prejudice.

12 Dated: March 15, 2024

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

The undersigned, counsel of record for Plaintiff Entropic Communications, LCC, certifies that this brief contains 3,982 words, which complies with the word limit of L.R. 11-6.1.

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Case No. 2:23-cv-01047-JWH-KES

I am employed in the county of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is: K&L GATES LLP, 10100 Santa Monica Boulevard Eighth Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90067.

On March 15, 2024, I served the document(s) described as:

- **DECLARATION OF RACHEL BERMAN IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF ENTROPIC'S APPLICATION TO FILE DOCUMENTS UNDER SEAL REGARDING REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS COX DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIMS**
- **ENTROPIC COMMUNICATIONS, LLC'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS COX DEFENDANTS' AMENDED COUNTERCLAIMS PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(6)**

on the interested parties in this action by delivering a true copy thereof as follows:

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☒ **BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE:** by transmitting a true copy of the foregoing document(s) to the e-mail addresses set forth as stated on the attached mailing list.

1 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of
2 America that the foregoing is true and correct.

3 Executed on March 15, 2024, at Los Angeles, California.

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5 */s/ Rachel Berman*
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